We consider the range assignment problem in ad-hoc wireless networks in the context of selfish agents: A network manager aims to assigning transmission ranges to the stations in order to achieve strong connectivity of the network within a minimal overall power consumption. Station is not directly controlled by the manager and may refuse to transmit with a certain transmission range because it might be costly in terms of power consumption.
As for the social cost, a fundamental problem is how to assign transmission ranges to the stations so that (i) every station i can reach any other station by using intermediate ones and (ii) the overall energy is minimized. This optimization problem, usually denoted as the minimum range assignment problem [14] , turns out to be a hard problem because of two factors (see Section 1.2 for more details):
• The cost for station for transmitting within range R is (proportional to) R , where 1 is a constant depending on the environmental conditions (e.g., in the ideal environment = 2) [18] .
• If a station i transmits with range R, then it actually broadcasts to all stations within that range. So, providing a direct connection from i to j also gives a set of connections to other stations "for free": Those stations at distance not larger than dist(i, j ), where dist(i, j ) denotes the distance between i and j . In order to compute a feasible solution, we need to know the distances from every station i to all other stations. These data are privately managed by station i which knows her position with respect to the other ones (this information is typically obtained by exchanging messages with the neighbor stations [18] ).
Unfortunately, when a network manager 4 asks such private data (i.e., relative distances) to the stations, the latter may report false values with the hope that the manager assigns them a smaller transmission range. This is where the selfish behavior of the node owners plays a crucial role. To avoid this, we aim to design a so called mechanism, that is, a set P of payment functions which, combined with a suitable algorithm that constructs a solution (i.e., a range assignment), rewards each station for her expenses in implementing the solution (i.e., the power corresponding to her transmission range). In particular, we want to achieve two goals simultaneously:
• Each station maximizes her utility (or profit) when reporting the true costs, where the utility is computed as payments minus costs; by knowing the mechanism, stations act rationally and report their true distances. A mechanism satisfying this property is called truthful (see Section 1.4 for a formal definition).
• The algorithm used in the mechanism (which determines the cost of each station) computes a "good" solution provided that the stations give the correct input (i.e., true distances) to it. The aim of this paper is to investigate the existence of feasible approximation truthful mechanisms for the above range assignment problem, that is, truthful mechanisms that compute approximate solutions in polynomial-time.
The model

Range assignments and power consumption
Let S be the set of stations. The range one has to assign to a station i is uniquely determined by the set of connections E i ⊆ {i} × S that i has to guarantee. Hence, a range assignment can be represented by the set E = ∪ i E i of all connections that must be maintained in the 4 Throughout the paper we use the term 'network manager'to denote any protocol computing a range assignment.
Thus, a 'network manager' should not be confused with a central authority somehow directly controlling the network resources.
network. The graph G(S, E) is called the communication graph.
For the sake of brevity, since S is fixed, we will denote G(S, E) simply as E. Clearly the set O of feasible solutions depends on the property we require for E.
The definition of the cost of station i to establish the connections in E i in the wireless network model is different from that in any wired network model. In the latter, this cost is proportional to the sum of the costs of all connections in E i while, in a wireless network, the connections in E i can be established by means of a single transmission performed with power sufficient to reach the farthest recipient in E i . The cost of this transmission is determined by the power with which i has to send the message. Let C i j be the cost of station i to send a message with (minimal) power sufficient to reach j .
We assume that the range assignment is chosen by a network manager. In order to choose a low-cost solution, the manager needs information about the cost of the connections. So, in the first phase, every station i sends her cost vector C i = C i 1 , . . . , C i n to the manager. Let C = C 1 , . . . , C n be the n 2 -vector containing all the connection costs. In the second phase, the manager, based on C, computes a suitable range assignment E ∈ O and asks station i to transmit messages with power sufficient to maintain E i .
The cost of station i for maintaining the communication graph E, denoted by cost i , is thus
Hence, the total cost of the range assignment E is
Assigning transmission ranges to stations that (i) guarantee a required connectivity property between stations and (ii) minimize the overall power consumption (i.e., the total cost) of the network gives rise to interesting algorithmic questions. In particular, these two aspects yield a class of fundamental optimization problems, denoted as range assignment problems, which has been the subject of several recent works in wireless network theory [14, 10, 6] . In this paper we consider one of the most studied connectivity property: Strong connectivity (SC). It is thus required that the communication graph induced by the range assignment is strongly connected. This allows all-to-all communication. Optimal solutions of the resulting range assignment problem, denoted as Min-Range(SC), are minimal cost range assignments whose induced communication graph is strongly connected.
Selfishly-acting stations
We consider each station as a selfishly acting agent that privately knows part of the input: Station i privately knows C i that the manager must use for the computation of a feasible solution. To stress that the agent declarations might deviate from the true cost vectors C i , we shall denote them by D i .
A mechanism for Min-Range(SC) is a pair (ALG, P ), where ALG is an algorithm that, on input D = {D 1 , . . . , D n }, returns a feasible range assignment E = ALG(D) and P = P (D, E) is the payment vector. Hence, agents, being selfish, will try to maximize their utility
We require the mechanism to guarantee, for every agent i, the existence of a so called dominant strategy, that is, a strategy i such that, for every possible choice of the other agents, agent i maximizes her utility by following strategy i . In this case the mechanism is an implementation with dominant strategies. Otherwise, if we only require that the mechanism guarantees the existence of strategies 1 , . . . , n for all agents 1, . . . , n such that any agent i maximize her utility by following i in the case every other agent j follows j (Nash equilibrium strategy) we say that the mechanism is a implementation with Nash strategies. Implementations with dominant strategies are thus stronger than those with Nash strategies. A dominant strategy remains the best strategy no matter what the other agents do (in particular, also when some agent does not act rationally). Furthermore, the latter are often impractical from a computational point of view. In fact implementation with Nash strategies require that agents achieve a Nash equilibrium and computing a Nash equilibrium is "a most fundamental computational problem whose complexity is wide open" [19] .
A mechanism is truthful with respect to dominant strategies (to Nash equilibrium strategies) if declaring the truth (i.e., D i = C i ) is a dominant strategy (a Nash equilibrium).
Though nontruthful implementations with dominant strategies (Nash equilibrium strategies) are possible, Gibbard [11] proved that, if there exists, for a given problem, an implementation with dominant strategies (with Nash equilibrium strategies), then there exists a truthful implementation with dominant strategies (with Nash equilibrium strategies).
For the above reasons we concentrate on mechanisms that are implementations with truthful dominant strategies, from now on simply truthful mechanisms.
Previous related works
In this section we review the main previous results on assignment problems and some fundamental results on algorithmic mechanism design.
Range assignment problems
The Min-Range(SC) problem is known to be NP-hard even when the connection cost vector C yields an Euclidean 2-dimensional space (e.g., when stations are located on the plane and = 1) [7, 14] . On the other hand, Min-Range(SC) admits a polynomialtime 2-approximation algorithm [14] . Finally, the problem is polynomially solvable when stations are located on the line (i.e., linear radio networks) [14] . For further results on other versions of the range assignment problem, we refer the reader to [6] .
(Algorithmic) Mechanism design 1.2.2.1. Truthful VCG mechanisms.
The theory of mechanism design dates back to the seminal papers by Vickrey [21] , Clarke [3] and Groves [12] . Their celebrated VCG mechanism is still the prominent technique to derive truthful mechanisms for many problems (e.g., shortest path, minimum spanning tree, etc.). In particular, when applied to combinatorial optimization problems (see e.g., [16, 20] ), the VCG mechanisms guarantee the truthfulness under the hypothesis that the mechanism is able to compute the optimum and the optimization function is utilitarian, that is, the optimization function is equal to the sum of the single agents' valuations.
Feasible mechanism design.
Since for several important optimization problems it is not possible to compute the optimum in polynomial time, unless P = NP, Nisan and Ronen [17] focused on the truthfulness of VCG-based mechanism, that is, mechanisms obtained by replacing, in the VCG ones, the exact algorithm with an approximation one.
They first showed that sub-optimal solutions are not suitable because a false declaration may improve the computed solution and therefore the utility of the agent. In particular, they define a class of optimization problems, termed cost minimization allocation problems (CMAP) and they proved that truthful VCG-based mechanisms compute, for any CMAP problem, either an optimal solution or a solution arbitrarily far-off the optimum.
To avoid this, they introduce the so called second chance mechanism. For CMAP problems, second chance mechanisms only guarantee a weaker form of truthfulness.
Our contribution
Even though the Min-Range(SC) problem is a utilitarian problem (see Eq. (1)), thus admitting a truthful VCG mechanism, such a mechanism requires the computation of a minimum-cost solution. The latter problem is NP-hard [7, 14] , thus implying that the resulting VCG mechanism cannot run in polynomial time, unless P = NP.
We investigate the existence of VCG-based truthful mechanisms. The importance of these mechanisms is twofold: (i) On the one hand, VCG (-based) mechanisms are still the major technique to derive truthful mechanisms; (ii) on the other hand, real problems require fast computations of "sufficiently good" solutions. The latter goal seems to require truthful mechanisms since, in our problem, an optimal algorithm running on false costs may produce arbitrarily bad solutions.
Our first result rules out the possibility of obtaining polynomial-time truthful approximation VCG-based mechanisms. We indeed show that if a VCG-based mechanism (ALG, P) for Min-Range(SC) is truthful then it is either optimal or it computes a solution of cost arbitrarily far off the optimum. So, any polynomial-time truthful mechanism for the Min-Range(SC) has an unbounded approximation ratio unless P = NP. The proof of this negative result can also be derived by showing that the Min-Range(SC) is a CMAP (as mentioned in Section 1.2.2, CMAP problems do not admit truthful VCG-mechanism [17] ). However, this alternative proof is even longer and counterintuitive.
We then consider the special case in which the true agents costs form a metric space (e.g., stations located on an Euclidean space and = 1). We first observe that our direct proof of the negative result does not apply to metric instances. This led us to investigate this important relevant case. We provide a simple truthful VCG-based mechanism that, when applied to metric instances, returns a constant approximate solution. We emphasize that even this special case is NP-hard [7] and no efficient truthful mechanism was previously known.
The algorithm used in our mechanism was proposed by Calinescu et al. [2] : They showed that this algorithm guarantees a golden ratio approximation, that is ( √ 5 + 1)/2 1.618. In this paper, we also improve the analysis of that algorithm by achieving a tight approximation ratio of 1.5. We also prove a similar result for the practically relevant case 1 < 2 and well-spread instances, that is, instances in which stations are located on the plane and any two stations must not be "too close". Well-spread wireless networks have been studied in [5, 8, 9] . Because of interference problems, this is the typical situation in radio networks adopted in practice [15, 18] 
Interestingly, our mechanisms are always truthful and the approximability does not require the mechanisms to know whether the instance is metric or well-spread. Notice that, even if the true costs yield a metric or a well-spread instance, the declared costs might not satisfy any of these properties. However, since our mechanisms are always truthful, agents are motivated to reveal the truth and so the approximation is guaranteed.
Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we provide the hardness result of the Min-Range(SC) problem for the general case. In Section 3 we describe the truthful VCG-based mechanism that, for metric and well-spread instances, guarantees a constant approximation ratio (Section 3.2). Finally, in Section 4 we discuss some open problems.
Preliminaries
A mechanism for Min-Range(SC) is a pair (ALG, P ), where ALG is an algorithm that, on input D, returns a feasible range assignment E = ALG(D) and P = P (D, E) is the payment vector.
Let D −i denote the vector of declarations of all agents but agent i. Let further D −i ; C i denote the vector D where the declaration of agent i is replaced by C i . A mechanism (ALG, P ) is truthful if, for any agent i and for all possible declarations D −i of the other agents, the corresponding utility
is maximized when D i = C i .
Definition 1. A mechanism (ALG, P ) is called a VCG-based mechanism if the payments
. . , P n are of the form
where h i (·) is any function independent of D i .
Intuitively, these mechanisms achieve truthfulness by relating the utility of an agent with the total cost of the solution chosen by the mechanism: The better the solution the higher the utility. In order to formalize this statement let us consider the utility of agent i. From (2) we get
E).
Since h i (D −i ) is independent of her declarations, agent i tries to minimize cost( D −i ; C i , E). Hence, her declaration should be chosen in order to let the algorithm return a solutionẼ which minimizes cost( D −i ; C i , E). This can be achieved by declaring the truth, assuming that the mechanism, by using ALG, is able to find an optimal solutionẼ.
Definition 2. A mechanism (ALG, P ) is a VCG mechanism if it is a VCG-based mechanism and
and O is the set of all possible outputs.
Theorem 3 (Groves [12]). VCG mechanisms are truthful.
Finally, let E * ∈ arg min E∈O (cost(D, E)), we define opt(D) = cost(D, E * ).
VCG-based mechanisms for Min-Range(SC): The hardness result
As mentioned in the Introduction, finding an optimal solution in polynomial time for the Min-Range(SC) problem is NP-hard. So, it turns out that efficient mechanisms should make use of approximating solutions. However, we next show that any reasonable truthful VCG-based mechanism (see Definition 1) requires an algorithm that computes an optimal solution.
A mechanism (ALG, P ) is called degenerate if the approximation ratio produced by ALG is unbounded, i.e., for any R > 0, there exists a true cost vector C such that
Theorem 4. If a VCG-based mechanism (ALG, P ) for Min-Range(SC) is truthful then it is either optimal or degenerate.
Proof. Let (ALG, P ) be a non-optimal truthful VCG-based mechanism for Min-Range(SC). We will show that it is degenerate. Since ALG is not optimal, there exists a cost vector C and a communication graph Y (i.e., the optimal communication graph) for which cost(C, ALG(C)) > cost(C,Y).
Let us defineĈ = Ĉ 1 , . . . ,Ĉ n where, for any i, j = 1, . . . , n,
where is any positive "large" constant such that > max{C i j | i, j = 1, . . . , n}. Now, we construct the following sequence of cost vectors:
Proof. Notice that in S z , only the values of edges which are not in Y change. Since those do not influence the value of cost(S z ,Y), the claim follows.
The next claim states that the mechanism fails to find the optimal solution Y also for the cost vector S n .
Claim 6. cost(S n , ALG(S n )) > cost(S n ,Y).
Proof. Because ALG is not optimal on C = S 0 , we have
We next prove that, for all z = 1, . . . , n
The second inequality holds because the mechanism is assumed to be truthful. Indeed, if it would not hold, agent z would be better off declaringĈ z instead of C z . The first inequality holds since, by the choice of , it holds that S z−1 S z component wise. By combining all the 2n + 1 inequalities with Claim 5, we get the thesis.
Let us now consider the cost vector S n and the communication graph X = ALG(S n ). From Claim 6, it follows that X is not optimal and an edge e ∈ X exists which is not in Y. Indeed, from Eq.
Let i be the agent (node) to which e belongs to. SinceĈ = S n , the cost of agent i in the solution X is cost i (Ĉ i , X) = . Hence, cost(S n , ALG(S n )) . From Claim 5, we know that cost(S n ,Y) does not depend on , thus implying that
is unbounded, so the mechanism is degenerate.
A truthful mechanism for metric and well-spread instances
In this section, we derive a mechanism for the Min-Range(SC) problem which is always truthful and it achieves a constant approximation for both metric (i.e., = 1) and well spread-instances. The metric version of the problem will be denoted as Metric-Min-Range(SC).
The Hub algorithm: The algorithm adopted by our mechanism is simple: It computes a range assignment that contains a directed minimum spanning tree (of the complete directed graph induced by the agent declarations) oriented towards a sink node s and all the outgoing edges from s. Calinescu et al. [2] proved that this Hub algorithm guarantees a performance ratio of ( √ 5 + 1)/2 1.618 for the metric case. We say that a graph is an hub-tree if it contains a directed spanning tree towards a sink node s and all outgoing edges from s (Fig. 1). 
A truthful VCG-based mechanism
Let us consider the VCG-based mechanism M = (Hub, P ) where Hub is the algorithm defined above and P is defined as
Theorem 7.
The mechanism M = (Hub, P ) is a truthful mechanism for the Min-Range(SC) problem.
Proof. Proposition 3.1 in [17] states that a VCG-based mechanism with an output algorithm that is maximal in its range is truthful. Hence the theorem simply follows by observing that the Hub algorithm computes a hub-tree of minimal cost.
The approximation property of the algorithm
In the sequel, thanks to Theorem 7, we will assume that the declared costs induce a Euclidean instance. It is easy to verify that this bound is tight for the Hub algorithm. Indeed, consider the instance in Fig. 2: The cost of the optimal solution is cost(C, T ) + (Fig. 2b) whereas the solution of the Hub algorithm has a cost 3 2 cost(C, T ) (Fig. 2a) . The proof of Theorem 8 needs some preliminary technical results.
Lemma 9. Let C be the agent cost vectors and let w M be the maximum edge-cost of the minimum spanning tree T . Then it holds that
Proof. Let E * be an optimal solution for Metric-Min-Range(SC) and let v be any station in S. As observed in the analysis of the 2-approximation algorithm in [14] , E * must contain a minimum spanning tree T directed towards v. Then
Since there exists (at least one) v such that cost(C v , (E * ) v ) w M , then the thesis holds. The proof of the following result directly follows from Definition 10 and from the Hub algorithm.
Fact 11. The sink agent chosen by the Hub algorithm is a central point of the minimum undirected spanning tree induced by the agent true costs C.
The following is a classical result in graph theory.
Theorem 12 (Jordan [13] ). In a weighted tree T , with positive weights, the graph center contains one node or two adjacent nodes.
Proof. The proof follows by observing that the subgraph induced by the graph center of a weighted graph G is always a clique. This easily implies that the graph center of a tree contains no more than two vertices.
A weighted tree is thus denoted as central tree when its center is a single node and as bi-central tree otherwise. Proof. Let us first assume that T is a bi-central tree (see Theorem 12) whose central points are x and y connected by an edge of weight w(x, y). It is easy to verify that the two paths P x and P y , that testify the eccentricity of x and y respectively, share only the edge (x, y), that is
Indeed, this intersection is not-empty (otherwise the eccentricity of x and y would be w(P x ) + w(x, y) = w(P y ) + w(x, y) > R) and does not contain other edges (because T is a tree). It thus follows that
Hence, the thesis holds for bi-central trees.
As for central trees, let c be the central point of T and P c be the path from c that testifies the eccentricity of c. We claim that there exists (at least) one path P c which starts from c, it is disjoint from P c , and such that
where x belongs to P c . Indeed, let P x be the path starting from x whose length testifies the eccentricity of x. Since c is the only central point then w(P x ) > w(P c ). Moreover, P x passes through c because, otherwise, w(P x ) w(P c ) − w < w(P c ) (see also From Fact 11, R is the cost of the sink station then, by combining Lemma 9 and Lemma 13, the thesis follows.
Well-spread instances
Let us consider the case in which the stations are located on the 2-dimensional Euclidean space and, for any i, j = 1, . . . , n, it holds that C i j = dist(i, j ) 2 , where dist(i, j ) is the Euclidean distance. This case corresponds to that in which stations lie in the empty space. A family S of instances is well-spread if a positive constant exists such that, for any S ∈ S,
Informally speaking, in a well-spread instance, any two stations must be not "too close". Because of interference problems, this is the typical situation in radio networks adopted in practice [15, 18] .
Theorem 14. The Hub algorithm guarantees a O( ) approximation ratio for the
Min-Range(SC) problem on well-spread instances.
Proof. We have that the performance ratio of the Hub algorithm satisfies the following bound cost(C, Hub(C)) opt(C)
w(T ) + diam(S) 2 w(T ) ,
where w(T ) denotes the cost of a minimum spanning tree for C. Since w(T ) (n − 1) (S) 2 and (S) diam(S)/ √ n, we get cost(C, Hub(C)) opt(C) = O( ).
Conclusions and open problems
In this paper we investigated the existence of truthful VCG-based mechanism for the Min-Range(SC) problem. We proved that, in general, every polynomial-time truthful VCG-based mechanism computes a solution of cost far-off the optimum (unless P=NP) and that there exists a polynomial-time truthful VCG-based mechanism achieving constant approximation for metric and well-spread instances.
Several interesting problems related to our results are still open. The most important, in our opinion, are those listed below.
• The existence of VCG-based mechanisms for the Min-Range(SC) problem restricted to the case = 2.
• No result is known concerning mechanism design for the Min-Range( ) problem when the property is different from the strong connectivity. We remark that for many of the these problems the negative result of Theorem 4 holds. When the required connectivity property is a directed spanning tree from a source station (i.e., the broadcast property) the problem is NP-hard for > 1 [4] and it is approximable within a constant [1, 4] . It is thus interesting to investigate whether it is possible to derive an approximation VCG-based mechanism exploiting the results in [1, 4] . • In our model the private information of each station is the set of distances with respect to all other stations. Other reasonable private information can be considered: For instance we can assume that the protocol has a partial knowledge of the network topology.
• Even though the VCG method is the major technique to obtain truthful mechanism, a fundamental future research is to develop alternative methods to manage selfish behavior in the context of energy consumption in wireless networks.
